The effect of provider control of blue shield plans on health care markets / BEBR No.942 by Arnould, Richard J.


&JS\ c J--3
im
CENTRAL CIRCULATION BOOKSTACKS
The person charging this material is re-
sponsible for its renewal or its return to
the library from which it was borrowed
on or before the Latest Date stamped
below. You may be charged a minimum
fee of $75.00 for each lost book.
Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons
for disciplinary action and may result In dismissal from
the University.
TO RENEW CALL TELEPHONE CENTER, 333-8400
UNIVERSITY OF IUINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Hit o. gg
APR 1 5 1
When renewing by phone, write new due date below
previous due date. L162
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/effectofprovider942arno
5Sf
THE LIB
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 942
UNIVI
AT III
The Effect of Provider Control of Blue Shield
Plans on Health Care Markets
Richard J. Arnould
Lawrence DeBrcck
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 942
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
March 1983
The Effect of Provider Control of Blue Shield Plans
on Health Care Markets
Richard J. Arnould, Professor
Department of Economics
Lawrence DeBrock, Assistant Professor
Department of Economics

Abstract
Numerous studies have been conducted to explain rapidly raising
costs of health care. Many of those studies have concentrated on the
influence of health insurance, and some more specifically on the
influence of provider control of health insurance plans on health care
costs. Blue Shield plans are not for profit and in many states are
granted regulatory advantages over other commercial insurers. A not-
for-profit firm cannot distribute rents to owners. Therefore, com-
petition between providers, plan administrators and consumers is
generated for rents that accrue to the plan from monopoly power
derived by the plan or regulatory advantages. Past efforts to explain
the behavior of these three groups have used single equation reduced
form estimations. In this paper we argue that when there are com-
peting goals among the groups controlling the Blue Shield plans , the
different possible "users" of the regulatory advantage or monopoly
market power become endogenously determined. Therefore, the
appropriate model is a four aquation system in which doctor's fees,
Blues' market shares, administrative slack, and output are determined
endogenously. Testing this model we find that doctors capture rents
by raising fees in doctor controlled plans, administrators capture
rents in nondoctor controlled plans, and in no case is output
increased. Therefore, the actual "users" of the rents serve to reduce
consumer welfare.

I. INTRODUCTION
Raising health care costs have received increasing attention in
national policy debates. Health insurance plans— by far the most pro-
minent means of financing medical care—have been considered by many to
be a culprit in the rapid inflation in health care costs. Feldstein
(1973) provides a theoretical basis, and Sloan (1980b) and Sloan-
Steinwald (1976) empirical evidence of the increase in demand for medi-
cal services resulting from health insurance. The most important
single private supplier of insurance is the Blue Cross/Blue Shield
group. Although it is incorrect to consider the Blues as a single
national firm since individual plans have considerable autonomy, their
market share has recently hovered slightly above 50% of all the private
insurance business in the United States. The Blues are the dominant
firm in most states. The remainder of the health insurance market is
unconcentrated (Thorndike, 1976; Angus, 1976).
Such examples of relative size often are not enough to warrant
significant research into the efficiency of the industry; if the health
insurance industry is sufficiently competitive, market forces should
lead to the proper performance on the part of the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield suppliers. Indeed, that half of the insurance market which is
supplied by for-profit, commercial insurers has generally been assumed
competitive in previous research on health insurance (Freeh and Ginsberg,
1978). However economic interest in this area of research arises because
of the existence of regulatory advantages granted to the Blues and the
unique relationship that exists between many of these plans and the
providers. The regulatory advantages provide subsidies to the Blues
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that introduce the possibility of inefficient behavior. Briefly, the
not-for-profit Blues plans are granted tax reductions which permit them
to operate at lower costs than their for-profit counterparts. Theore-
tically, such advantages could be used to drive the commercial insurers
out of the market. Obviously such is not the case.
Some recent research has examined the methods by which the subsidies
to the Blue Shield plans are exploited. Freeh (1974) and Freeh-Ginsberg
(1978) estimate single equation models which examine the effects of
regulatory subsidies on both administrative efficiency and the market
share of the Blue plans. However, as pointed out in Arnould and
Eisenstadt (1981), Eisenstadt and Kennedy (1981), Sloan (1980a), and
Lynk (1981), property rights and therefore, plan control, play a very
important role in the behavior of not-for-profit firms. The idea that
the group in control of a not-for-profit firm will extract the rent
accruing to the property value of the control, has met with success
in previous economic studies. We apply and extend that analysis here.
Put differently, a commercial insurer would have obvious claimants for
any residuals brought about by a lower cost position. However, a not-
for-profit firm is, def initionally , unable to explicitly capture those
rents as profits and distribute such residuals as dividends. Instead,
models of economic theory predict that the groups that control not-
for-profit institutions will seek to maximize their own interests.
Therefore, it is important that any examination of the effects of the
tax subsidy on the Blue plans' performance also consider the interests
of the controlling group.
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A unique relationship exists between providers and the Blue Shield
plans. Most, if not all, plans were initiated by local or state medi-
cal societies (Reed, 1947). Initially, these plans were controlled by
the providers. Many plans remain under various forms and degrees of
provider control. The relative control of a local Blue Shield plan by
physicians should have a significant effect on how the regulatory sub-
sidy is "used" by the Blue Shield plan. The three groups competing for
rents from the plans are the providers, plan administrators, and the
insureds. Clearly, if the plan is operated for the benefit of the in-
sureds the administrative loading charge of the Blue Shield plan should
be minimized'1 resulting in the exit of commercial insurers. That not
being the revealed outcome strongly suggests that providers and plan
administrators are extracting rents. Providers controlling plans maxi-
mize their utilities, in part, by increasing their fees and incomes.
Plan administrators, likewise, maximize their utilities by engaging in
various forms of expense preference behavior. Numerous studies have
examined effects of Blue Shield's market dominance and find empirical
support for the hypothesis that plans controlled by medical societies
have higher maximum allowable charges for physicians. Sloan (1980a)
finds providers are more likely to participate in the plan if they also
control the plan. Arnould and Eisenstadt (1982) found actual charges
by providers to be greater in areas where the Blue Shield plan is pro-
vider controlled. This contradicts any evidence that doctors engage in
fee discrimination based on insurance coverage. Finally, Freeh and
Ginsberg (1978), Freeh (1976) and Vogel (1977) found the insurance load-
ing charge to be greater for Blue Shield plans than for commercial plans.
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All of these studies, except Vogel, rely on a generalized assumption of
monopoly power held by Blue Shield and do not specifically tie the fin-
3
dings to the regulatory advantages.
Arnould and Eisenstadt (1981) found evidence of a significant rela-
tionship between fee inflation among medical society controlled plans
and tax advantages granted to Blue Shield plans. Similarly, Eisenstadt
and Kennedy (1981) found higher loading charges existed in nonprovider
controlled plans when those plans had tax advantages over the commer-
cial insurers. In contrast, Lynk (1981) found either no relationship
or an inverse relationship between provider control and provider fees
with various model specifications. Similarly, Kass and Pantler (1979)
found no relationship to exist between administrative slack and provider
control.
All of the previous studies have estimated the effects of a con-
trolling group on performance of Blue Shield plans using reduced form
single equation models. Unfortunately a significant problem is
encountered with such single equation estimates. When there are com-
peting goals among the groups controlling the Blue Shield plans, the
different possible "uses" of the regulatory advantage or monopoly
market power become endogenously determined. The extent to which each
possible goal is satisfied will be simultaneously determined and should
be greatly influenced by the distribution of property rights in the
Blue Shield plans controlling body (Oats, 1981). In fact, the several
studies mentioned above clearly demonstrate the wide range of possible
uses of Blue Shield residuals. We suggest that biases resulting from
the specification problems of the single equation models are the causes
of the non-robust results.
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The present study simultaneously accounts for the effects of con-
trol by various groups on the efficiency of Blue Shield plans while
differentiating between rents derived from regulatory advantages and
those derived from other sources of market power. As such, a multi-
equation estimation is required to avoid biased estimates. Two stage
least squares estimation is performed on the equations. In the next
section we develop a model of the interaction of the various control
groups primarily based on models developed in earlier studies. This
model by separating generalized monopoly power held by 31ues' plans
from that resulting from regulatory advantages and by explicitly
accounting for output, and therefore, welfare effects of provider con-
trol provides a stronger basis for policy prescriptions. Section III
describes the data and results of empirical estimation of the model
developed in Section II. Finally, conclusions and policy recommenda-
tions are presented in Section IV.
II. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Provider control dates back to the origins of Blue Shield plans.
State medical societies were instrumental in forming the first Blue
Shield plans (Sloan, 1980a). Close medical society ties were built
into the development of most plans that emerged through the 1940 's and
1950' s. The initial capital for many plans was even advanced by juris-
dictional medical societies (Reed, 1947). Individual doctors further
underwrote plans by signing participation agreements. These agreements
stated the fees that doctors would accept as reimbursements for patients
insured by the Blues. Many states, as a condition of Blue Shield
enabling acts, require medical society approval of the plans or majority
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representacion by providers on Che board of directors. An extreme case
of provider control exists in Wisconsin where Blue Shield of Milwaukee
is contained in the corporate structure of the Milwaukee County Medical
Society. In other plans where providers do not control the boards of
directors the medical societies have veto power over any changes in re-
imbursement policies. Thus, substantial influence over plan policy was
placed in the hands of the providers.
The enabling legislation in the states required Blue Shield plans
to operate on a not-for-profit basis. Blue Shield plans also received
substantial regulatory advantages over commercial insurers. The Blues
were exempt (or subject to reduced rates) from payment of state income
and premium taxes, and many plans face lower local and state property
taxes (Freeh, 1974) permitting them to operate at a lower level of costs,
ceteris paribus , than their counterparts, the commercial insurers.
Bylaws and Membership Standards of the Blue Cross-31ue Shield Asso-
ciation proscribe much of the behavior of Blue Shield plans. However,
there remains within the power of the individual plans substantial
autonomy from the Association. Casual observation of differences in
coverage, participation agreements and methods of reimbursement of doc-
tors provides evidence of the leeway granted individual plans by the
national association. Even though the Association requires a plan to
have the support of jurisdictional medical societies, eleven plans did
not have much support in 1977 and one plan had developed an adversary
relationship with the state medical society (AMA, 1978).
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Actions of Competing Groups
Provider control of some Blue Shield plans has diminished consider-
ably since the inception of those plans. Organized buyers of the
insurance coverage offered by the plans have offered resistance to pro-
vider control. This breakdown of control has provided the opportunity
for providers, consumers and plan administrators to compete for rents
accruing to these not-for-profit entities. In what follows, we develop
an analytical framework that explains the motivations and interactions
of these competing groups.
A variety of analytical models have been developed to explain the
process of health care insurance. For the initial framework, we use a
standard model, such as in Freeh (1981). In Figure 1, we model the
4
theoretical demand for quality-constant units of health care as DD.
A constant cost of health or medical care production equal to MC
results in an equilibrium output of medical care at price P per
O ci
unit. The introduction of Freeh's "idealized" insurance has the effect
of reducing the marginal cost of medical care, P , to the consumer,
thereby rotating the demand curve around its intersection at D on the
horizontal axis. In the case of complete insurance, in the absence of
time and travel costs, demand can be represented by the vertical line
DD in Figure 1. In the present context most Blue Shield insurance
c
requires some co-insurance, rotating demand in Figure 1 to some level
between DD and DD depending on the level of copayment , e.g., DD' , with
c
equilibrium output .
Medical
Care D'
Medical Care
Figure 1
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Consuraer 3ehavior
To explain the competition for rents consider a Blue Shield plan
that is operated for the benefit of the consumers in a state where the
Blues are not granted regulatory advantages. Assume that such a plan
is described by DD' in Figure 1. In the absence of regulatory advan-
tages and if the remainder of the insurance market is competitive, the
equilibrium output of medical care would be Q . Assume that consumers
choose the optimal amount of insurance according to the optimization
process described by Ehrlich and Becker. Then consumers maximize uti-
lity of income I over two states of nature, the well state, I , and the
sick state, I_, where U(I..) > U(I C ), and S occurs with probability p.
Then maximizing expected utility,
ECU) = (l-p)U(L.) + p U(I.)W b
subject to a zero profit constraint for the not for profit insurers
E(tt) = (l-p)(I^-I
w
) + p(Ig-I
s
)a
where 1^ and I„ represent the consumers' initial endowment of income
in the well and sick states respectively and a is the insurance
loading charge yields first order conditions
(i-p)u-(i
w
)/ Pu'(i
s
) -ifji,
These conditions state that the consumer purchases insurance to the
level where the ratio of the marginal utilities of income in W and S
are equal to the fair price of insurance times the load factor.
Therefore, anything that reduces a will increase the demand for
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insurance reducing P to the consumer in the period insured, thus,
H
pivoting DD further to the right.
In the absence of regulatory advantages , it is shown by Sloan
(1980a) that not-for-profit firms can expand output to the level where
average revenue products of inputs are equated to marginal input
costs. The Blues could choose to offer more attractive insurance
packages than the commercial insurers forcing the latter from the
market. Even though the 31ues dominate most health insurance markets,
the commercials remain a significant fringe.
In those markets where Blue Shield is granted regulatory advantages
in the form of tax reductions over those paid by commercial insurers
the insurance loading charge, ot, will be lowered for the Blues by the
amount of the tax reductions. As stated earlier, a reduced a results
in a greater demand for insurance coverage and, therefore, a greater
demand for medical care, e.g., DD . Insurance packages are not homo-
R
geneous , the differentiation in quality of coverage and price responds
to differences in consumer attitudes toward the risk of incomplete
coverage in the event of illness. However, a Blues plan operating in a
market with a regulatory advantage over other insurers, at the margin,
can offer more attractive insurance in any one (or more) of the quality
or price characteristics. Thus, if all rents accruing from regulatory
advantages granted to the Blues were captured by the consumers, output
would expand to 0. in Figure 1 and the commercials would be driven from
the market. Doctors' incomes would increase as a result of the expanded
units provided but prices would not increase if MC are constant.
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Administrator Behavior
The continued existence of commercial insurers who face higher costs
than Blue Shield insurers implies that the regulatory advantage is not
being used to offer substantially more attractive packages than the
commercial insurers. The extent of coverage may be different, but the
fact remains that higher cost commercial firms are able to retain, on
average, roughly half the market.
Thus, we turn to plan administrators for a potential explanation of
the use of the residual rents provided Blues' plans by the regulatory
advantage. With regulatory advantages X-inef f iciency, or administra-
tive slack, can be explained by the property rights model of not-for-
profit firm behavior.
Eisenstadt and Kennedy (1981) and Kass and Pautler (1979) argue
that administrators use plan control to capture the rents generated by
regulatory advantages in a manner that maximizes their utility func-
tions. Clearly this goal is inconsistent with the goal of output maxi-
mization of a plan conducted for the benefit of the insureds. Utility
maximization may take the form of excessive administrative salary and
compensation packages (Williamson, 1964; Arnould, 1982), inefficient
expansion of the administrative staff (Edwards, 1977), and the provi-
sion of a variety of managerial emuluments. The result of any of these
forms of expense preference behavior is an increase in a potentially
equivalent to the cost reductions generated by the regulatory advantage
6
or monopoly rents in the absence of regulatory advantages. Thus, as
depicted in Figure 1, equilibrium output would not expand to Q but
would remain at Q if all units were extracted by plan administrators.
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Pfovider Behavior
If monopoly rents and/or rents generated independently by regula-
tory advantages are captured by consumers or plan administrators prices
of providers' services will remain constant. Alternatively, providers
may use plan control to gain rents from the plans. A variety of analy-
tical models have been used to explain this behavior.
First, we will describe health insurance markets in which the domi-
nant Blue Shield plans have no regulatory advantages and are controlled
by providers. Eisenstadt (1979) used a dominant firm price leadership
model to explain the behavior of provider controlled plans. He argued
that doctors would increase reimbursement levels of Blue Shield plans.
Blue Shield plans not having regulatory advantages will not be placed
at a competitive disadvantage with commercial insurers because, in the
absence of fee discrimination, higher reimbursement levels will raise
the cost or force a reduction in the level of coverage provided by the
Q
commercial insurers as well as the Blues. The parallel oligopsony
model developed to explain the behavior of plans not controlled by pro-
viders predicted that those providers would receive a competitive level
of remuneration, as would commercial suppliers. Sloan (1980a) used a
bilateral monopoly model to predict similar results. In the context of
our graphical analysis, the real price of medical care, in this case
units of doctors services, is increased to, e.g., P ' , with equilibrium
output reduced to Q . As mentioned earlier, many single equation esti-
mates have confirmed this result.
Medical societies have a number of methods available to raise pro-
vider fees. Methods of reimbursing providers differ across Blue Shield
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plans. Traditionally, most Blue Shield plans used fee schedules deve-
loped from relative value scales to set maximum reimbursable charges.
Providers' incomes may be enhanced by setting the fees at higher levels
and requiring more frequent updates of the fees. However, the diffi-
culty and cumbersome problems of establishing and updating fee schedules
restricts the rate of increases in fees. Therefore, it is not surprising
to find that four of the five 31ue Shield plans using fee schedules to
determine reimbursement rates were not controlled, at the time of our
sample, by the jurisdictional medical society.
Most Blue Shield plans have adopted the more flexible usual, cus-
tomary, and reasonable (UCR) method to determine reimbursement rates.
Fee profiles are established for physicians in an area. UCR reimburse-
ment in the current period is defined as a certain percentile (usually
the 90th) of actual fees charged in the previous period. The lagged
relationship between actual charges and UCR levels provides an auto-
matic update of fees, thus avoiding the cumbersome problem of deter-
mining the appropriate amount by which to increase fee schedules. Pro-
vider controlled boards can increase the frequency of the UCR update,
e.g., from 12 months to 6 months, increasing provider reimbursements
if actual charges are increasing. Also, Slue Shield boards have the
authority to define the conditions for determining UCR methods. By
establishing more lenient methods, e.g., by recognizing specialties,
providing area pricing within plan areas, and more frequent updating,
reimbursement will be greater.
Alternatively, many authors [Pauly (1968), Sloan (1980b), Freck and
Ginsberg (1978)] have suggested that doctors use this market power to
-14'
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induce increased demand for their services, i.e., generate "moral
hazard" in the insurance market. This form of moral hazard increases
the probability, p, of state, S. In the absence of significant income
effects increases in p result in increases in the demand for medical
care covered by the insurance. The result is shown in Figure 2 in the
form of increased demand for medical care, DD" . Equilibrium output is
increased to Q from Q ; price per unit of care is not increased butM B
providers' incomes are increased through the provision of more units.
\n obvious alternative is one in which the monopoly power is dissi-
pated in some combination of induced demand and price increases.
Finally, if provider controlled plans enjoy regulatory advantages
the monopoly power of the providers will be further enhanced. All of
the regulatory advantages could be exhausted by the provision of more
insurance coverage, as shown by DD in Figure 1. Providers' incomes
R
are enhanced by the provision of additional units of output to Q . The
welfare implications of this use of the regulatory advantages are iden-
tical to those plans run for the benefit of consumers. However, this
would result in the exit of the commercial insurers not receiving regu-
latory advantages from the market, something that observation confirms
has not occurred. Thus, these plans must be operated as doctors'
cooperatives with the regulatory advantages being exhausted in higher
prices per unit of provider service or some combination of higher prices
9
and greater output. If the rents are captured in either of these man-
ners, the provider controlled plans will be "administratively" efficient,
Summary of Hypotheses
Summarizing the hypotheses then, it is clear that the existence or
nonexistence of provider control on Blue Shield plans can have different
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effects. The most obvious variable affected is doctors' fees; this has
been adequately examined in the previous single equation estimation
studies. Clearly, administrative costs are also endogenous to the
model; the controlling group will allow more or less of such expenses
according to their own utility function. However, as was just demon-
strated, the degree of provider control should also affect the number
of insureds which choose Blue Shield over commercial firms. Addition-
ally, it was also clear that the degree of provider control may affect
the output in the market. Whether provider control is used to offset
output has important obvious welfare implications relevant to the
appropriate public policy actions pointed out by Crew (1969). Enhanced
output may be of benefit to the insureds whereas price increases generate
a deadweight loss to society. These effects are summarized by the
following system of equations:
(1) RCF = f(C, R, AC, OR, , X)
(2) 3MS = f(R, C, RCF, Q X)
(3) AC = f(C, R, BNS, Q
s
, X)
(4)
S
= f(RCF, DR, X)
where RCF = doctors' fees
C = doctor control
R = regulatory advantages
BMS = Blue Shield market share
AC = administrative cost
DR = doctor/population ratio
-17-
Q = quantity of physician services supplied
S
X = demographic variables describing plan area.
The predicted signs of the partial derivatives are as follows: For
provider controlled plans with regulatory advantages:
3RCF/3C > 0,
3BMS/3C <
30/3C >
<
3AC/3C <
All previous studies confirming or denying these hypotheses may
have provided biased estimates due to their failure to account for the
simultaneous process through which provider fees, coverage (or output
levels), and market share of the Blues are determined. Clearly, where
provider controlled plans have a regulatory advantage, output and the
market share of the Blues may be influenced by the mechanism through
which provider control is used to increase fees. Therefore, the inclu-
sion of an output variable in equations containing control and regula-
tory advantages could bias the results. Similarly, controlled plans
without regulatory advantages may increase both fees and output,
generating a similar bias. Finally, regulatory advantages afforded
noncontrolled plans may result in increases in output and Blue Shields'
market shares. This follows from the fact that the rents to the regu-
latory advantage may be used to provide more attractive insurance poli-
cies. This generates further biases when control is included in a
reduced form equation with market share and output.
Similarly, administrative slack should be minimized in provider
controlled plans with regulatory advantages but, as in the case of
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providers' , fees Eisenstadt and Kennedy (1981) and Kass and Pautler
(1979) found conflicting results. We suggest that the lack of robust-
ness may be the result of endogeneity problems that can be overcome
with the proposed simultaneous equation system.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The data used to estimate the system of equations were drawn from
various sources. Data for variables that describe provider control of
Blue Shield plans come from Blue Shield plan applications for renewal
of membership in the National Association of Blue Shield plans and Blue
Shield plans' bylaws. Market shares of Blue Shield plans were calculated
from Blue Shield Enrollment Reports and the Health Insurance Association
of America's Source Book of Health Insurance Data . Administrative cost
data were taken from Renewal Applications and premiums charged were
found in Blue Shield Fact Books. Regulatory advantages were taken from
the Survey of Extent of Regulation and Taxation of Blue Cross-Blue Shield
Plans published by the National Association of Life Underwriters. The
price variable, RCF, was taken from the Health Insurance Association of
America's Prevailing Health Care Charges System . All other data includ-
ing fees for specific procedures, are taken from the 1975 and 1976 annual
surveys of doctors conducted for the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion.
Plan Specific Endogenous Variables
In an analysis of Blue Shield plans' bylaws it was found that poten-
tial medical society control of Blue Shield boards of directors does
not take on a unique form. Some plan bylaws provide that a certain
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nunber of board members be doctors; others that the medical society
select a certain number of board members (M.D.'s and others), and still
others provide for no medical society selection of board members but
grant the medical society veto power over any changes in provider re-
imbursements. Therefore, we use a binary measure of medical society
control, TMSCBD. TMSCBD is a dummy variable that takes on the value of
1 when the medical society either (1) elects, nominates, or approves
physician and public members of the various Blue Shield boards or (2)
has veto power over any board approved change in provider reimbursements.
Clearly, TMSCBD provides the most comprehensive measure of medical
society control.
The measures of doctors' fees used in the estimations, RCF, is the
weighted average fee for all surgical procedures in each plan area as
developed by Arnould and Eisenstadt (1981). Average charges for each
plan area were deflated by an area cost of living index.
The market share of Blue Shield plans, BMS, is defined as the per-
centage of total policyholders (Blue Shield and commercial major-
surgical) with Blue Shield surgical coverage.
We follow the lead of Eisenstadt and Kennedy (19S1) by defining
administrative costs as total administrative costs net of premium taxes
and revenue earned from fiscal arrangements. The variable AC is admini-
strative costs divided by the number of enrollees in the plan. As
pointed out by Eisenstadt and Kennedy (1981, p. 30), this measure is
more exclusive of revenues available for expense preference behavior of
provider fees.
Output is measured as the number of operations performed, TOP.
Unfortunately, the data available do not permit a measure of output
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exclusively provided to Blue Shield patients. Therefore, factors
influencing output other than provider control are included in the out-
put equation. However, this measure should not cause significant bias
because of Blue Shields' plans dominance of most markets. These other
factors are the doctor/ population ratio, Blue Shield market shares, and
non-physician input costs.
Exogenous Variables
A number of exogenous factors may shift demand and supply for both
doctors' services and Blues' plan membership. Clearly, there are a number
of determinants of the demand for physicians' services. In this study
we include median income in the plan area, MEDINC. Higher income
increases the cost of lost work days, etc., thereby increasing the
demand for doctors' services. Also, due to the labor intensity of
doctors' practices, MEDINC may provide a measure of office practice
costs. Percent of the population unionised, UNION, should decrease the
extent of BMS if employee benefit packages provide greater medical
insurance coverage than exists for the population as a whole. The per-
cent of the population over 65 and eligible for Medicare coverage,
POP65 , will increase the demand for medical services if the elderly
have a greater incidence of health care problems. However, Medicare
reimbursements tend to be lower than those of private insurers
,
poten-
tially reducing doctors' willingness to provide more than the necessary
services for these patients. The surgeon/population ratio, SURPOP,
is included. Moral hazard or supply generated demand may lead to
greater demand due to more doctors practicing in the plan area. Addi-
tionally, SURPOP may lead to supply shifts. Therefore, the effect
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of SURPOP on price raay be positive or negative depending on its
influence on demand. Other physician specific variables were not
appropriate for this study because the unit of observation is the Blue
Shield plan. Region dummies are included in the output equation to
control for interregional differences in health, climate, etc.
Finally, recall that the central thesis of this paper has been
that doctor control of Blue Shield plans which enjoy regulatory advan-
tages will lead to effects on several important variables. Thus, in
order to get a clearer picture of the dual effects of provider control
and the regulatory advantage, we must add an interactive terra. This
term, DIFDUM, is the result of multiplying TMSCBD and DIFTX; by its
nature, it allows comparison of joint effects. When doctors do not
control the board of the Blue Shield plan, this term has a value of
zero. However, when the plan is provider controlled, the term takes
the value of the regulatory advantage.
Names and explanations for each of these variables are shown in
Table 1.
Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results from the various estima-
tions performed. As has been adequately emphasized, the estimation
procedure employed was two stage least squares (2SLS).
The four structural equations used to explain the endogenous
variables are:
(1') RCF = a + axTIISCBD + aoDIFTX + a3DIFDUM + 34SURP0P + asMEDINC
+ a6YEAR + ayTOP + agAC + Eg
Table 1
Variable List
Variable
BMS
RCF
TOP
AC
DIFTX
TMSCBD
SURPOP
POP65
UNION
YEAR
MEDINC
DIFDUM
REGIONS
RECADV
Blue Shield market share.
Weighted average prices of surgical procedures physicians
charged commercial insurers in Blue Shield plan area.
Average number of operations performed per doctor in the
Blue Shield plan area.
Administrative costs net of premium taxes per enrollee.
Blue Shield tax advantage = Premium tax rate paid by com-
mercial insurers - Premium tax rate paid by Blue Shield.
Medical society control of Blue Shield board = 1 if the
medical society either (1) elects, nominates, or approves
physician and public members of the board or (2) has veto
power over any board approved change in provider reimburse-
ments.
Ratio of surgeons to population in the plan area.
Percent of population in the plan area over 65 years of
age.
Percent of nonagricultural workers in the plan area who
belong to a union.
Dummy variable equal to 1 for year 1975.
Median income in plan area.
Interactive term = (DIFTX) • (TMSCBD).
A set of 3 dummy variables used to indicate the Northeast,
North-central, South and West.
The effect of regulatory advantages on provider controlled
plans derived as the sum of the estimated coefficients on
TMSCBD and DIFDUM.
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(2') BUS = b + b 1TMSCBD + b2DIFTX + b 3DIFDUM + b^MEDINC + b 5 POP65
+ bgUNION + b7YEAR + b8TOP + baAC + e b
(3') TOP = c + cjTMSCBD + C2DIFTX + C3DIFDUM + C4SURPOP + C5MEDINC
+ c6 POP65 + C7YEAR + cgRCF + cgREGIONS+eT
(4') AC = d + d]TMSCBA + d 2 DIFTX + d 3DIFDUM + (I4MEDINC + d5UNION
+ dgYEAR + dyTOP + dgBMS + e A
The results of the 2SLS estimation of these equations are shown in
Table 2.
U
Recall that from the earlier discussion we identified 4 hypothe-
sized effects of provider control of subsidized Blue Shield plans.
First, we expected reimbursement to the physicians to increase,
3RCF/3C > 0; second, we expected administrative expenses to decrease
with provide control, 3AC/8C < 0; third we expected that Blue Shield
market shares in such provider controlled plans will be less than for
non provider controlled plans as we should see doctors capturing the
regulatory tax advantage enjoyed by Blue plans, 3BMS/9C < 0; and
finally, we are unsure as to the effect of provider control on output.
In addition to these hypotheses regarding doctor control of the
Blue Shield plans, we also posited that either regulatory advantage or
market power from other sources permitted doctors to exploit their
controlling interest. In order to isolate the importance of the regu-
latory advantage from other potential sources of market power to any
effects of doctor control, we must consider the joint effects of pro-
vider control and regulatory advantage; that is, we are interested in
the sum of the coefficients on TMSCBD and DIFDUM. This is shown as
REGADV at the bottom of Table 2. The proper t statistic to test the
significance of a linear combination is
Table 2
Primary Specif ication I Structural Equations
Dependent Variables
(t values in parentheses)
(* = significant at 5%)
(** = significant at 1%)
Independent
Variables RCF BMS TOP AC
Intercept 4.28xl0~4 -.025 -10.10 2.595
(3.38)** (.069) (.812) (0.433)
TMSCBD 7.12xl0~ 5 -.236 -3.79 -3.748
(1.87)* (2.20)* (1.61) (1.91)*
DIFTX 1.87xl0~° -.124 -5.02 -2.029
(0.69) (1.59) (.323) (1.74)*
DIFDUI1 -1.98xl0" 5 .095 1.66 1.288
(0.74) (1.15) (1.15) (0.941)
SURPOP 1.88xl0~
4
(0.64)
-18.25
(1.20)
MED INC -l.OlxlO
-8
6.43xl0~ 5 -2.96xl0~ 4 .0011
(1.08) (2.39)* (.282) (2.359)*
POP65 .017
(.785)
.066
(.087)
UNION .005
(1.10)
.083
(.821)
YEAR 5.49xl0~ 5 -.131 -5.77 -1.41
(1.11) (1.02) (3.07)** (.580)
RCF 4.9086
(1.05)
TOP 5.91xl0~6 -.026 -.254
(0.61) (1.08) (.579)
BMS -16.426
(2.41)**
AC 1.50x10
(1.74)*
-3
-.045
(2.20)*
REGADV 5.12x10
(2.05)*
-5
-.145
(2.56)**
-2.076
(1.02)
-2.45
(1.66)*
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t =
(a, + )'a )
"VVarta^ + ) 2Var(a ) + Z)Cov(a t a )
where ) is the mean value of DIFTX and Var(') and Cor(*) represent
variance and covariance respectively. The value of this test statistic
is shown under the label in parentheses under REGADV in Table 2.
Before turning to the examination of our hypotheses, note that the
results in Table 2 show that the coefficients on the explanatory
variables are of the expected sign in almost every case. We shall not
dwell on these obvious explanations but we do point out those numbers
that appear more interesting. The significantly negative effect of
Blue market share on administrative cost signals the existence of econ-
omies of scale; all other things equal, the average administrative
expense is lower for 31ue plans with a greater share of the market.
The very strong coefficient on YEAR in the output equation indicates
that physician utilization dropped over time. The positive effect of
AC on physician fees indicates that plans with higher costs had higher
prices, a result which helps to confirm the validity of the estima-
tion.
Turning to the coefficients dealing with doctor control and regu-
latory advantages, we find the estimation to be precise enough to
refute several of the null hypotheses.
As can be seen from Table 2, the coefficient on doctor control
has the expected sign in the fee equation, the market share equation,
and the administrative cost equation; additionally, the value of the
-26-
t-statistic indicates rejection of the null hypotheses in each case.
That is, we find that provider control leads to increased fees, lower
market share for Blue Shield plans and less administrative expenses.
These estimates imply that when doctors control the Blue Shield board
of directors, they succeed in raising their own rents at the expense of
subscriber advantages and administrative slack (X-inef f iciency)
.
The output equation, TOP, provides ambiguous results. Recall, we
were not certain as to the predicted effect of doctor control on out-
put. While the coefficient of control in the TOP equation is nega-
tive, it is not significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed test.
Thus, we cannot support the hypothesis that output changes, and we cer-
tainly found no evidence suggesting an increase in output in doctor
controlled plans.
We now examinate the value of REGADV to determine if regulatory
advantage provides further price and/or output enhancement in provider
controlled plans. REGADV has the same sign as the coefficient on doc-
tor control. The t-statistic associated with this term indicates that
regulatory advantages in provider controlled plans have a significant
effect on the dependent variables in the fee equation, the market share
equation and the administrative cost equation. In fact, in each case
the level of confidence in the estimate is greater than in those plans
without regulatory advantages. \s before, there is no evidence of
significance in the output equation.
The implication of this result combined with those above is that
the regulatory advantage is crucial in the ability of doctors to use
any control over Blue Shield plans. While the coefficient on doctor
-27-
control, TMSCBD, indicates the effect of doctor control on a plan with
no concern over the presence of regulatory advantages, the interaction
terra reflects the total effect of doctor control and the regulatory tax
advantages. Although the estimates are of more statistical significance
in the latter, surprisingly they have less absolute impact on the
explained variables, RCF, BMS, and AC. Evidence of significantly
greater output being consumed by insureds will provide support for the
hypotheses that providers share the rents with the insureds in markets
where the Blue Shield plans operate with regulatory advantages.
However, no such evidence was found.
CONCLUSIONS
This research should put to rest many issues pointing to
weaknesses in previous attempts to document the effects of provider
control of Blue Shield plans. Numerous hypotheses are supported under
the scrutiny of two stage least squares estimations. Provider control
results in higher fees and, as might be expected, a reduced Blue
Shield market share due to the doctor controlled plans being relatively
less competitive with commercial plans.
No support was found for the hypothesis that providers extracted
rents in controlled plans by increasing output. This may be a phenom-
ena resulting from the service benefit plans common to Blue Shield.
Consider the scenario where the plan is not doctor controlled. Under
a service benefits plans providers can extract higher incomes by engaging
in a form of activity that results in moral hazard by encouraging forms
of elective surgery covered by the plan. However, our results indicate
-28-
that market power and regulatory advantages permit providers to extract
higher rents without enhancing output.
Evidence was found to support the hypothesis that provider
controlled plans are more efficiently administered. It was found that
administrative costs tend to be less in provider controlled plans.
This follows from the expectation that when providers control plans
rather than administrators, less administrative slack occurs; doctors
will capture a large share of any residual rents. However, this also
provides strong evidence that nonprovider controlled plans, at least a
significant proportion of the rents, are captured by plan administrators
and are not passed on to consumers in the form of greater coverage.
Finally, we found strong evidence that three of the endogenous
variables were consistently significantly influenced by regulatory
advantages enjoyed by Blue Shield plans. While earlier single-
equation studies that assumed doctors with control used the Blue
plans' market power to extract rents, we find that the regulatory
advantage is a significant source of those rents. As shown in Figures
1 and 2, Blue plans controlled by doctors use those rents to increase
their reimbursement at the expense of insured subscriber coverage and
administrative costs.
-29-
Footnotes
1. See Arnould and DeBrock (1982) for a discussion of the relative
importance of 31ue Shield market share in the efficiency of the
equilibria in health care markets.
2. Enabling legislation in many states required Blue Shield plans
to use community rating. Various forms of community rating still
exist in many Blue Shield plans. In those areas the commercials
may find niches in markets where Blue Shield has regulatory ad-
vantages by offering plans that experience rate the enrollees.
3. Vogel (1977) took into account tax differentials enjoyed by
certain Blue Shield plans but did not consider provider control.
4. In the absence of insurance, DD is generated from a standard one
period utility maximization problem:
max U = f(X,H)
subject to Y = pX + p H
where U represents utility; X is a vector of all goods except
health; H represents units of health; Y is total income, p is a
vector of prices of X, and p is the price of health care.
H
5. Freck (1981) defines "idealized" insurance as insurance that has
no adverse incentives, such as, moral hazard, or subsidy effects.
6. Freck and Ginsberg (1974) found a to be significantly greater for
Blues' plans than for commercial insurers. However, their empirical
model did not relate that difference to regulatory advantages or
plan control.
7. An exception to this may occur if rents are captured by consumers
in the form of greater insurance coverage and MC is increasing.
8. Sloan and Feldman (1981) and Arnould and Eisenstadt (1982) show
that point of sale price discrimination is no longer a widespread
strategy in the physician service market.
9. Empirical evidence of the former result (higher prices) was found
by Arnould and Eisenstadt (1981), Sloan (1980a), and Kass and
Pautler (1979). However, the significant relationship between
Blue Shields' market shares and regulatory advantages found by
Freck (1979) and Greenspan and Vogel (1979) suggest that the rents
are captured in both higher provider prices and greater output.
10. Cost-of-living deflators were derived by calculating a weighted
average of the urban and regional cost of living values. If the
plan area contained no city for which BLS cost-of-living are
published, the nearest BLS city was used.
-so-
il. The coefficients of the region dummies in equation (3') are 1.63
for Northeast, 3.41 for North-central, and -1.65 for the South;
all are measured with very poor precision.
-31-
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